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Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism: Europe and the global in everyday 
European lives28 
 
In this chapter, we will take another look at the data our study provides on what might be 
called “everyday transnationalism” among ordinary European populations. European 
integration has provided for an extraordinary range of rights enabling ordinary European 
citizens to benefit from participation in a wide and open European space, whether for 
economic and business reasons, leisure, tourism and consumption, or in terms of wider 
knowledge and interest in countries around the region. Transnationalism has become a 
commonplace feature of everyday life for ordinary citizens across the continent. 
In academic analyses of Europe, however, it has become routine to argue that European 
integration most benefits elites and upper classes—the people most likely to have 
international connections – while being of much less benefit to lower classes (Fligstein 
2008). This is then linked to the widespread mistrust and (sometimes) hostility among 
ordinary citizens to the European project in political and identification terms. Other 
sociologists (i.e., Beckfield 2006) have presented evidence that European integration is 
causing more inequality in the context of global economic change. 
Related to this perception—and which also threatens the integrity and future of the EU—
is growing Euroscepticism among people who may feel themselves to be the “losers” of 
European integration, especially in countries which are politically and economically 
important to the European project’s success. Among our countries, we are able to take a 
close look at the often openly Eurosceptic UK and Denmark, but also consider countries 
which have had high levels of support, but where there is now growing doubt.  
Our question is whether these attitudes make sense in terms of the growing 
transnationalism in these same countries? Firstly, we might be interested to know 
something about the relative scale of transnationalism across Europe, and whether it is 
strongly associated with more privileged social positions. Secondly, we might ask about 
the geography of this transnationalism: whether it can be classified a European 
transnationalism, and how it relates to the rest of the world (i.e., globalisation). Thirdly, 
we would be curious to know if and why such transnationalism might be related to 
cosmopolitan values, which would both point to a progressive global outlook, as well as 
concurring with the European promoting of particular values: its so called “normative 
power” agenda (Manners 2002). In this way we might be able to look into the apparent 
paradox of highly transnational yet supposedly Eurosceptic nations, as well as assessing 
to what extent the EU can take credit for the spread of cosmopolitan values alongside the 
“everyday transnationalism” it has facilitated. 
All of the above questions can be answered initially with the quantitative data gathered in 
the first round part of the research, the EUCROSS survey. Yet another part of our mission 
in EUCROSS was to generate qualitative data, through follow up in-depth interviews with 
a sub-sample of the original survey, the EUMEAN survey. We are thus able here to offer a 
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first analysis of the different meanings and nuances given to these questions by members 
of different European member states. Here, starting from the in-depth findings of our 
own country case, Denmark, we offer some preliminary comparisons and contrasts with 
understandings in Germany, Spain and the UK. The qualitative interviews, certainly, put 
more of an accent on what we might call the varieties of European transnationalism and 
cosmopolitanism, while in our reading of the quantitative analysis we stress more the 
close commonalities of Germany, Denmark and the UK (i.e., of both “core” and “outsider” 
EU member states), and their overall difference from the Southern and Eastern European 
member states on these measures. 
 
A note on reference literature 
Our goal in this chapter is not to pursue theoretical questions from the literature, but 
rather to offer a straightforward descriptive analysis of the data on European 
transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, as well as some analysis about how it is 
determined by obvious social markers such as class and education. We are pursuing these 
questions in other publications aimed at scientific journals (i.e., Favell and Reimer 2013; 
Favell and Reimer 2014b; Solgaard Jansen and Favell 2014). We have also published one 
policy brief which shadows closely this chapter (Favell and Reimer 2014a). 
EUCROSS builds on and expands the study on German nationals published in a 
monograph by Steffen Mau (2010). This was noteworthy for shifting the debate on 
transnationalism in Europe away from migrants and elites, and examining instead the 
everyday “ordinary” national populations of a core European member state. It found 
remarkable evidence for the transnationalisation of the German population since its 
heyday as a self-contained welfare state in the 1960s. Already to simply replicate Mau’s 
study for more European countries would be a significant advance. Moreover, our study 
also relates to two other works, with similar goals, but different methodologies. Savage et 
al. (2005), a mixed methods study of the ordinary middle and working class populations 
of Northern England, similarly showed how deeply transnational practices and 
cosmopolitan values have been integrated routinely into the lives of quite average British 
populations, although with a distinctive geography that intersects less with the European 
mainland. A further recent study by Andreotti, Le Galès and Moreno (2013), on urban 
dwelling upper bourgeoisies in France, Spain and Italy, found that while embracing many 
of the opportunities (i.e., financial and social) of transnational lifestyles, they retained a 
strong sense of place and involvement in their home cities. They were highly “mobile” but 
not “migrant”. Our survey goes substantially beyond Eurobarometer techniques, 
including the one that has most delved into similar subjects, Eurobarometer 65.1 (as 
operationalised by Kuhn 2011, 2012; Mau and Mewes 2012; Delhey et al. 2014). 
These various studies above provide important indicators of what we expect to find 
among our European populations. A further key reference that we put to use here is Díez 
Medrano’s earlier work (2003) on the variety of perceptions of Europe. In his mixed 
methods study of British, German and Spanish “framings” of Europe, he pinpoints strong 
geographical, historical and psychological differences underpinning each country’s 
general understanding of the European identity question. Our study is particularly 
relevant in this sense as we are able to look at the same three countries, while adding a 
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Nordic variant, Denmark. 
 
Quantitative findings  
Without a doubt, general support for the EU has suffered considerably as a result of the 
recent economic crisis in Europe and a negative perception of the EU’s handling of the 
situation. On this, Eurobarometer measures are sufficient to gauge the backdrop of 
change in the continent, provoking a widening gap between political opinion and 
everyday practices. When asked in Eurobarometer 2012 (EB 77.3), it was found that EU 
citizens continue to support, or are at least neutral about the idea of the EU, but are now 
much less happy about “the present direction of the EU”.  
 
Figure 1 Attitudes towards image and present  direction of European Union across 5 EU 
countries 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 77.3, 2012 
 
Across the continent, it is clear that European citizens feel that the EU is not working as it 
should. In this context, the Danish and British results, for example, can be seen less as 
outliers. In fact, formal measures in Denmark continue to suggest that Denmark has 
maintained a relatively positive view of the EU despite the temper of its media debates. 
Britain posts the most negative results to the other member states, suggesting an 
implacable Euroscepticism in well over half the population. In other similar measures, 
from both Eurobarometer and EUCROSS, about attachment to the EU or whether a 
person would be sad if the EU were gone tomorrow, Danish percentages are remarkably 
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close to Germany, Italy and Spain, which are all considered more core, supportive 
members of the EU. British results confirm it as an outlier in overt political hostility 
toward the EU. 
 
Figure 2 Attachment to European Union and reaction to European Union dissolution scenario 
across 5 EU countries (per cent) 
 
 
 
Source: (1): Eurobarometer 77.3 (2012); (2) EUCROSS Survey. 
 
What is puzzling about all this is that the EU explicitly and implicitly stands for 
cosmopolitanism, and when we relate these issues to the level of cosmopolitanism in 
these two countries compared to others using results from EUCROSS, there is little to 
suggest that the British, let alone the Danes, are out of step with the solidly European 
norms and values of their neighbours (as shown in Gerhards 2007). Some of these 
cosmopolitan measures are distinctive to the European conception of the good society 
and polity, such that they are also a mark of a European “civilisational” influence quite 
distant from, say, North American or East Asian alternatives (Therborn 1995). 
A first kind of measure concerns the widespread acceptance or tolerance of diversity. On 
these measures, whether we take a first question about the make up of society by 
different ethnic, religious or cultural origins as a good or bad thing, or a second question 
about whether foreign forms of media and culture are a bad thing for the national 
culture, Britain scores high on cosmopolitanism, close to its other West European 
neighbours. Danes meanwhile obviously feel provoked by the first formulation of 
cosmopolitan diversity, posting a much lower acceptance, while being more comfortable 
than other countries about the second, the influx of foreign media and cultural products. 
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Moving to a third measure – identification with the world as a global citizen – Denmark, 
Britain and German all post similar mid level identifications, somewhat less overtly 
cosmopolitan than their southern neighbours. Regarding then a fourth dimension of 
cosmopolitanism, about feeling responsible for other nation’s fortunes, a further 
distinction becomes apparent. The British are just a little less solidaristic than their rich 
Northern European neighbours. But enter the EU into the question (“the EU should bail 
out member states in times of crisis”), and figures fall quite dramatically for the British, 
but also for Denmark and Germany, with the Germans (probably in the light of Greece’s 
debt crisis) even more hostile than the Britain. Only the Southern Europeans retain a 
sense of European solidarity through thick and thin. 
Table 1 Cosmopolitan Attitudes (% of “yes” responses) and Cosmopolitan Index across 5 EU 
Countries 
  
Feel 
citizen 
of the 
world 
Different 
ethn./culture/
rel. good for 
society 
Exposure to 
foreign 
film/music/bo
oks good for 
culture1  
Help of EU 
country 
stuck by 
disaster by 
all EU 
countries 
Pooling of 
state 
funds to 
help EU 
member 
state in 
crisis2 
Cosmopolitan 
Index3 (range 
0-1) 
 
Denmark 46 53 72 90 42 0.57 
UK 49 68 70 82 38 0.64 
Germany 47 76 69 86 32 0.62 
Italy 64 71 71 94 71 0.70 
Spain 80 73 68 94 76 0.74 
Spain 70 60 68 94 54 0.72 
Source: EUCROSS Survey. 
1
In the original question the formulation “damaging for culture” was used. The 
item was reversed so that it fits in the direction with the other items. 
2 
The original item was dichotomized 
so that the values 4 and 5 on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) represent 
agreement with the statement. 
3 
Based on an additive index of the five cosmopolitanism dummy variables 
divided by five. 
 
These findings can be added into a simple additive index (see last column in Table 1). 
Whether this is made up of all five measures cited or the first three (i.e., minus the supra-
national and EU governance questions), the Italians and Spanish score as more overtly 
cosmopolitan, through no doubt this is pushed up by an aspirational wish to feel they are 
first class global citizens as well as high minded solidarians with struggling neighbours. 
What is interesting though is that Britain and Denmark average out with a middling score, 
always very close to that ostensibly much “more European” – and certainly more overtly 
post-national – core member state, Germany. And on some measures, either Britain or 
Denmark seem to exemplify some of the highest aspirations of what is often referred to 
as the EU “normative power” agenda (Manners 2002); while consistently disliking the 
framing of these influences in terms of the EU. 
There is enough a puzzle here to suggest that we need to take a much closer look at 
British and Danish transnational practices to see if these differ from other member states, 
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particularly the core state, Germany. In the analysis here, we present twelve basic 
questions of transnationalism from the EUCROSS survey. We distinguish between 
transnational travel/mobility (six items), transnational social relations (friends and family, 
two items), transnational communication and consumerism (three items), and 
transnational human capital (languages, foreign language television, 2 items). In these 
analyses and later regressions we are also able to put in the figures for Romania, although 
the nature of their transnationalism may be somewhat different.  
Table 2 Dimensions of transnationalism (in per cent) across 6 EU countries 
Type of Transnationalism Denmark UK Germany Italy Spain Romania  
Travel & Mobilities       
Familiarity with one or 
more foreign countries 60 64 66 42 49 
 
24 
Lived in another country 
before turning 18 7 8 6 4 5 
 
1 
Visited at least three 
countries before turning 
18 
63 44 56 24 18 2 
Lived in another country 
for at least 3 month after 
turning 18 
23 24 15 12 14 11 
Participated in EU 
sponsored exchange 
program 
4 3 4 5 7 3 
3 or more overnight trips 
abroad in last 24 months 56 37 39 22 21 5 
Social Relations       
Know somebody living 
abroad 49 64 49 58 66 79 
Partner with foreign 
citizenship at birth 3 7 7 4 5 1 
Communication & 
Consumerism 
      
At least 10% of all received 
messages from abroad 
(email/phone etc.) 
23 27 33 21 26 33 
Sent money abroad (for 
reasons other than 
purchasing 
goods/services) 
15 11 10 12 11 4 
Purchased goods abroad 40 32 27 17 20 13 
Human Capital       
Command of at least one 
foreign language* 90 36 74 63 64 
 
56 
Watch foreign TV once a 
month or more 63 8 17 13 18 
 
35 
Source: EUCROSS Survey. *Note: Command of the language is defined as speaking the language at least at 
the “just so” level. 
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Transnational practices of course may not be restricted to a European scale: certain kinds 
of cross-border transaction or tie may be linked to growing global interconnections. Yet 
thought of this way it is striking how much more transnational European populations 
have become, and how much more transnational are countries that are often seen at the 
edge of the (inherently transnational) European project. These questions may thus not 
necessarily be restricted to Europeanised practices, but they do indicate general levels of 
internationalisation. We see here a high degree of internationalisation across the board: 
markedly in Germany (which we would expect, following Mau) but also especially in 
Denmark and Britain, there is a higher experience of living abroad, familiarity with foreign 
countries or knowing people in other countries.  
This practical transnationalism does not disappear, however, when we ask about 
practices more obviously linked to European integration. For example if we ask about 
whether they have bought goods abroad in the last 24 months, or look into the number 
of overnight trips to other countries in the last 24 months (two questions with a certain 
specificity to the regional scale of European mobilities), it turns out that the Danes are by 
far the highest, with Germany and Britain closely matched, and the Italians and Spanish 
much further behind. Only when we put in data related to a specific EU sponsored 
programme do the figures drop down towards the less EU inspired, as we would expect in 
Denmark and Britain (although similar to Germany), with Italians and Spanish more 
Europeanised in this sense. Danes also possess the most transnational human capital, 
measured in their ability to speak foreign languages – whereas few British speak another 
language than English. On the classic question of whether respondents are willing to 
move to live and work in another country, not surprisingly the Southern Europeans post 
high percentages: but over 50% of Germans and over 40% of Danes and British are willing 
to “get on their bikes” too—hardly consistent with their professed Euroscepticism.  
Figure 3 Willingness to move abroad (per cent yes-answers) 
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012 
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These various indicators illustrate concrete effects of European integration that may in 
fact suggest a certain Europeanisation of everyday life in Danish and British society, even 
if these populations often express negative opinions about it or are unlikely to explicitly 
identify with it. To formalise these results though, we put together a complete additive 
index of transnational practices (not shown), consisting of thirteen items, collapsed into 
an overall score ranging from 0-13.    
 
Table 3 Transnationalism Index across five EU countries 
DK UK GER IT ESP ROM 
4.98 3.65 4.03 2.93 3.22 3.16 
Source: EUCROSS Survey. Based on additive Index of 13 binary variables. Range for Index 0-13. 
 
What these results display is that on a O-13 scale Danes score 4.98 – considerably higher 
than Italians and Spanish, whereas Germans and British are closely matched somewhere 
in between. Given that we do not have an equal amount of items for each dimension of 
transnationalism, the dimension “physical” mobility particularly receives more weight in 
our index (6/13=46%) compared to the other dimensions. While we think our first index is 
a plausible operationalisation of transnational practices, weighing the items equally 
across all dimensions leads to very similar results in terms of average levels of 
transnationalism across countries. There is in sum here a strong indication that everyday 
Europeanised practices in Denmark and Britain far outstrip the conscious identification 
with or support for the European project.  
The principle objection to these findings are likely to be related to parallel work by Mau 
and Mewes using Eurobarometer (2012): that these kinds of differences might be 
accounted for by country level differences, for example relative wealth, or by 
geographical and cultural specificities in relation to the wider world. While some of this 
challenge remains outside the scope of this chapter, we are able to control for standard 
education, occupation and demographic variables to check that these results hold across 
social groups in the various countries. 
Certainly there are similar relative differences between class or educational groups (it 
tends to hold for both variables) in terms of transnationalism. In very broad terms, one 
can indeed read this in terms of Fligstein’s thesis in Euroclash (2008), which presents a 
stark portrait of the winners and losers from European integration. However, EUCROSS 
results suggest nuances need to be suggested to this rather crude polarised view of the 
European crisis. Interestingly, in highly transnational countries such as Denmark and 
Germany, respondents with mid level education have reached levels of transnationalism 
similar to those of the highly educated in the lower ranked transnational countries. There 
is some evidence here for a broader “massification” of the effects of European integration 
in some countries, in opposition to the simple polarisation suggested by Fligstein. It is 
widely reported that middle class Danes and British (i.e., not just “elites”) are some of the 
most enthusiastic in utilising their European free movement rights: in terms of buying 
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property abroad or retiring in the South of Europe (Favell 2014). In order to follow up on 
these claims we explore to what extent each of the 13 different transnational practices 
reported in table 2 is unequally distributed across different social groups in the six 
EUCROSS countries. To that end we chose to calculate “odds ratios” that express the 
relative degree of inequality in access to or performance of a certain practice. An odds 
ratio of 2 for “familiarity” in Germany means that respondents with tertiary education are 
2 times more likely to be familiar with another country than respondents with less than 
tertiary education (e.g. secondary and compulsory education). Note this may be relative 
to large percentages or small (see Long and Freese 2006). 
 
Figure 4 Educational Inequality in transnational mobilities across six countries. Odds-ratios 
between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
DK GER IT ROM ESP UK
Familiarity
Lived in another country before 18
Visited at least three countries
before turning 18
Lived in another country for at
least 3 month after turning 18
Participated in EU sponsored
exchange program
3 or more overnight trips abroad in
last 24 months
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey. 
 
Given that in most cases the odds ratio is well above 1 indicates that that the higher 
educated respondents display a higher degree of mobility across all six practices. There is 
some variation across the type of mobility practice in terms of inequality. The figure 
suggests that the more resource-craving types of mobility practices are more unequally 
distributed in each of the six countries (e.g. three or more overnight trips in the 24 
months, travel to many countries before the age of 18). Finally, it seems like there is not 
very much variation between the six countries in terms of the degree of inequality across 
items, although Romania seems to standout at least with respect to some mobility 
practices.  
In a next step we take a look at the other specific forms of transnationalism.  
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Figure 5 Educational Inequality in transnational relations across six countries. Odds-ratios 
between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below 
  
In Figure 5 we see that transnational relations are not very stratified across levels of 
educational attainment in the EUCROSS countries. Both the measure for knowing 
somebody abroad and having a partner with foreign citizenship hardly surpass an odds-
ratio of 2 in any of the selected countries. Again, with the exception of Romania, levels of 
inequality are quite similar across all of the countries. In the following analysis (Figure 6) 
we then look at financial relations across borders. Level of education plays a bigger role in 
Romania when it comes to “middle class” consumerism, which is indicated as quite 
routine among West Europeans across all educational groups. Sending money abroad 
does not seem to be particularly related to educational background whereas receiving 
messages from abroad seems more prevalent among the respondents with higher 
education.  
 
Figure 6 Educational Inequality in transnational consumerism & communications across six 
countries. Odds-ratios between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below 
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012 
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Finally, looking at consumption and ability to participate transnationally because of 
language skills (human capital), we get the results of figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 Educational Inequality in transnational human capital across six countries. Odds-ratios 
between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below 
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012 
 
Here, not surprisingly there is a much stronger stratification across education 
relationship, regarding language (which is of course correlated with higher levels of 
education), although less in Germany and (surprisingly) the UK. There is a quite consistent 
relationship in terms of cultural consumption of foreign products (here TV). 
In a final step, we dichotomize the summary index of transnationalism into a high 
transnationalism group (scores 6-13, 22 percent of the pooled sample) and low 
transnationalism group (scores 5 and below, 78 percent of the pooled sample) to gain an 
impression of how education, class and gender are related to transnationalism across 
Europe.  
In terms of educational level inequality in “high transnationalism” almost linearly 
increases from North to South. The UK, the country next to Spain with the highest level of 
inequality, does not quite fit this pattern however. We might infer that these countries 
are more likely to sustain the Euroclash type reading, while countries with less inequality 
of access to transnationalism, Denmark and Germany, may be showing more signs of 
massification. Figure 8 also reveals that stratification in transnational practices seems to 
be much more related to education than to class. Possibly this can be interpreted in a way 
that transnational practice is to a lesser extent a direct consequence of financial 
resources or social prestige (i.e., class) and to a larger extent associated with a more 
international outlook and attitude that gets typically fostered in the higher education 
environment (access to which may of course be stratified by class or not). Finally, with the 
exception of Romania, age is almost not related to transnationalism, while women slightly 
less often display high levels of transnationalism than men.  
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Figure 8 Inequality in high transnationalism (scores 7-13 on the index of all 13 items) across 
Education (tertiary vs. lower) Class (High ISEI Score – 68 and above vs. lower)29 and Gender 
(Male vs. Female) 
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey. 
 
As regards geographical specificities, there is a wealth of data available from the survey, 
regarding the particular relationships of certain countries with others around the globe. 
To take our first example, Denmark, it is possible to analyze these relationships in terms 
of familiarity with foreign countries, travel, and social networks abroad. These data 
presented in table form are the equivalent of the Google world maps that have been 
constructed from internet data that map out each country’s particular geographical 
relations in the world.30 The following figures are based on a follow up question with 
regards to which country specific forms of transnational practice are related. Since 
respondents in the EUCROSS survey were allowed to name multiple responses in case 
they for example are familiar with more than one foreign country, the following figures 
present cumulative frequency counts of all named countries. 
 
                                                 
29
 This cutoff follows Ganzboom and Treimann (1996: 214) coding of the service class according to the 
Erikson-Goldthorpe class scheme based on ISEI scores.   
30
 For a look at how Google represents this kind of data, see the following website: 
http://www.facebookstories.com/stories/1574/interactive-mapping-the-world-s-friendships. 
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Fig 9 Knowledge: Which countries are you familiar with?  
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Fig. 10 Travel. Which countries did you live in for more than three months? 
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Fig. 11 Social relations. Where are the people you know located? 
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Figs 12/13 Which countries are you familiar with? North-West and South-East countries grouped. 
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Figs 14/15 Why are you familiar with these countries? (absolute numbers)  
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Unsurprisingly, familiarity is clearer with more contiguous neighbours, but in terms of 
travel and social networks the USA and even some Asian countries loom large in 
Denmark. Where we have some interesting results is in putting alongside these results for 
Denmark with other member states. In fact a clear North-South distinction can be found if 
we group these nations into “North-West” and “South-East” Europe, with Denmark, 
Germany and the UK resembling each other much more than they resemble the Southern 
European forms of transnationalism. We choose one of these questions as an illustration: 
familiarity with other countries. 
Of course, identifying inequalities between the North and South in Europe overlooks 
other structural inequalities that might be found across Europe, between social classes. 
This in itself might be a feature of Europeanisation, and is certainly the challenge at the 
heart of Fligstein and Beckfield’s argument: that European integration is feeding off 
inequalities, and leading to a more individualised and fragmented European society, for 
all its egalitarian talk about citizenship or the proud boasts in the Lisbon Agenda 
elsewhere of being able to achieve growth with sustainability and social cohesion. Our 
study therefore moves in its final quantitative stage to a full analysis of the relation to 
cosmopolitanism in terms of various socio-economic controls. 
In this last step we explore whether transnational practices observed in our sample of 
countries can be systematically related to cosmopolitan values by regressing the 
cosmopolitan index on transnational practices. We go beyond previous work by 
introducing our four dimensions of transnationalism (mobility, relations, 
consumerism/communication and capital) separately in the model. Furthermore we can 
account for a richer set of control variables that might mediate the relationship between 
transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. In addition, we ran separate models for high vs. 
low education respondents to explore whether the strength of the relationship between 
transnational practice and cosmopolitan values is of equal relevance across educational 
levels. One could hypothesize that transnational practices are more common among the 
wealthy and privileged, but are more beneficial (i.e., make more of a positive difference) 
for the development of cosmopolitan attitudes for respondents with lower levels of 
education.  
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Table 4 OLS Regression of Cosmopolitan Index on four Dimensions of Transnationalism and 
Socio-demographic Control Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a 
Educ=High 
Model 2b 
Educ=Low 
Transnationalism
1
:     
Mobility 0.090* 0.059 0.044 0.067*   
Relations 0.053** 0.049** 0.039 0.053*   
Communication/Consum. 0.086** 0.066* 0.071* 0.064*   
Human Capital 0.077** 0.049* 0.035 0.060*   
Country (Reference: UK)     
Denmark -0.078*** -0.051** -0.089*** -0.025    
Germany -0.049*** -0.028** -0.053*** -0.006    
Italy 0.205*** 0.217*** 0.198*** 0.247*** 
Romania 0.051** 0.064*** -0.007 0.116*** 
Spain 0.243*** 0.255*** 0.223*** 0.286*** 
Female 0.020 0.018 0.028* 0.012    
Age -0.028 -0.042 -0.047 -0.045    
Place of birth (Reference: Ctry. of res.)     
EU country -0.019 -0.014 -0.006 -0.022    
Outside EU country 0.002 0.001 0.009 -0.007    
Partner citi.ship not COR at birth -0.023 -0.019 -0.034 -0.010    
Education (Reference: Compulsory)     
Secondary  0.040      
Tertiary  0.117*                  
ISEI (imp.)
2
  0.059* 0.054* 0.061**  
R² 0.121 0.136 0.120 0.117    
N 5408 5408 2061 3347 
Source: EUCROSS Survey * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: 
1
 Each dimension of transnationalism is based on an additive index based on the dummy indicator 
variables presented in table 2, divided by the number of items for each dimension. 
2
 Missing ISEI values for 1172 observations were imputed using STATA’s impute command using country, 
age, gender, place of birth and citizenship of partner at birth. 
 
Table 4 reports unstandardized coefficient estimates from four OLS regression models 
based on our pooled country sample. In the first model transnational practices, a set of 
basic demographic controls (age, gender place of birth) as well as country dummy 
variables are included. To test whether a potential association between transnational 
practices and cosmopolitanism cannot be simply attributed to respondents’ 
socioeconomic position, we introduce measures for respondents’ education and 
occupational status (ISEI) in a second model. The estimates from Model 1 show that each 
dimension of transnationalism is significantly related to cosmopolitan attitudes. As would 
be expected, in Model 2, controlling for occupational status and education reduces the 
coefficient size for all dimensions of transnationalism. Nevertheless, all coefficient 
estimates remain statistically significant with the exception of transnational mobility. 
These results are in line with previous studies showing that the effect of transnational 
practices on cosmopolitan attitudes (Mau et al. 2008) or European identification (Kuhn 
2012) cannot be simply attributed to socioeconomic control variables. The coefficients for 
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the country dummy variables (Britain is the reference category) indicate that net of 
transnationalism and sociodemographic controls, pronounced and statistically differences 
in cosmopolitanism between countries remain: The British have higher net levels of 
cosmopolitanism than the Danes and the Germans, and lower levels than Italians, 
Romanians and Spanish. It follows that while cross-border transnational practices do 
seem to influence cosmopolitan orientations in the expected direction, they cannot 
account for the observed country differences. Finally we run model 2 separately for 
respondents with higher education (model 2a) and lower levels of education (model 2b). 
Comparing the two education-specific models reveals that all of the coefficient estimates 
for transnationalism remain statistically significant in the model for respondents with 
lower levels of education, the opposite is true for the “higher education model” where 
only the coefficient estimate for consumerism/communication is significantly different 
from zero. These results point in the direction that travelling and engaging in other forms 
of transnational activities might potentially have more of an impact on individuals with 
lower levels of education. These are tentative conclusions, however and we should also 
point out that the coefficient estimates for the different types of transnational practice in 
the “lower education model” are not drastically higher compared to the “higher 
education model”.  
The above analyses offer a guide to the strongly emergent transnationalism among 
ordinary European populations, as well as some indication of how this relates to 
expanding cosmopolitan values that have been influenced by the European project in the 
context of regional integration and globalisation, albeit without necessarily always being 
connected explicitly to political support for Europe. The cosmopolitanism expressed in 
generic questions, however, may not always have the same meaning in every European 
context. As we have seen, transnationalism has its own geographical varieties, and 
following Díez Medrano (2003) we would expect that the cosmopolitanism found in each 
country might also have its own distinctive expressions, according to “local” (i.e., 
national) differences in each country’s relation to Europe and the World. Accordingly 
then, we are able to here supplement the quantitative analysis above with below a first 
qualitative analysis of the in-depth interview material gathered in the EUMEAN survey. 
We will focus selectively on evidence from (as in Díez Medrano) Germany, Spain and the 
UK, in relation to our reference country Denmark. 
 
Qualitative findings 
Díez Medrano (2010) argues that Eurobarometer type surveys rarely help us to 
understand the dynamics of European integration at the national level, because there are 
marked qualitative differences in the way the European project is perceived and 
understood in different member states. He speaks of this in terms of the way Europe is 
“framed” differently in different places. This could be related to the historical specificities 
and trajectories of different member states, as much as their geographical location. In his 
work he considers the fairly obvious contrasts in this respect of Spain, Germany and the 
UK, also delving into internal regional differences within these countries. 
The Danes 
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Taking this as an inspiration, we began our analysis of the EUMEAN data with the Danish 
case. Prominent among the Nordic states, Denmark reveals itself as an ideal test ground 
for exploring the paradoxes of nationalism, Europeanisation and globalisation in Europe 
today. Long known for its affluence, its high ratings in terms of levels of globalisation, and 
for being allegedly the happiest people on Earth, Denmark is an archetypal small nation 
that has known well how to position itself for success in the currents of international 
politics and economy. Yet in recent years, its golden image has become tarnished by both 
a fairly intransigent attitude towards European cooperation – a version of Euro-scepticism 
– as well as a quite harsh anti-immigrant politics grounded in a kind of “common sense” 
populist xenophobia. ISSP data from 2004 on national identity shows that Danes, 
comparatively more than their Scandinavian friends in Norway and Sweden, want to live 
in Denmark rather than any other country (81%). This clarifies the continuous importance 
of the national scale in the Danish case. 
We are interested in how these issues show up in the everyday life of ordinary Danes. As 
part of the research for EUCROSS, in additional to the large N telephone survey, a small 
number of follow up interviews were made with Danish residents. Crucially, we opted for 
a wide sprad of locations in different parts of Denmark, some very far out in the regions 
away from the metropolitan centre, Copenhagen, even though the major part of this 
small sample were rated as “high transnationalism” in the original survey. In particular, 
we see our work as contributing to the effort to develop new qualitative methods and 
instruments in European identity research after Díez Medrano (Duchesne 2010; Duchesne 
et al. 2013), as well as studies about the empirical human dimension of international 
mobilities and globalisation in everyday life (Savage et al 2005; Mau 2010). Counter to 
their politically expressed Euroscepticism and nationalism, ordinary Danes of a variety of 
backgrounds engage in a wide range of European, global and cosmopolitan practices in 
everyday life, which nuance their obviously expressed range of “banal Danish-isms” (Billig 
1995; Jenkins 2011). We also share the effort in the recent sociological and geographical 
literature (i.e., Andreotti et al. 2013) to shift discussions on mobility away from the 
limited numbers of obvious movers in Europe to more settled, mass populations. 
We connect the investigation above into the relation of cosmopolitan attitudes and 
transnational practices to perceptions of space, place and belonging on the other. In part 
this implies investigating the experience and choice of residential place within Denmark 
as well as how Denmark as a collected space is negotiated and constructed in a changing 
global context in the lives of these ordinary citizens, in the light of a seemingly large range 
of differentiated transnational practices such as leisure travel, work related mobility 
and/or experiences of the effects of globalisation, i.e. immigration, new technological 
possibilities and increased personal international connections. From such stories, we 
further show how and when different scales, such as the city, the national, the European 
and the global are invoked to make sense of the world they live in. In the Danish context, 
the city of Copenhagen has a special role as a spatial reference in strategies of “elective 
belonging” (Savage et al. 2005) and a sense of self, in contrast to living in Jutland (the 
mainland) where choices concerning residency are mainly linked to family questions. 
Variations in cosmopolitan attitudes and transnational practices may be linked with these 
belonging strategies, but crucially we find that the geographical periphery is not any less 
transnational than Copenhagen, only sometimes differently transnational; social class too 
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– frequently cited as the main factor in explaining opportunities for transnationalism or 
cosmopolitanism – does not seem to determine the kind of cosmopolitanisms expressed 
by Danes, and it only affects certain transnational practices. Most Danes are in many 
ways comfortably transnational and cosmopolitan in banal ways that would satisfy 
anyone looking for proof of Europe’s cosmopolitan “normative power” agenda (Manners 
2002; Beck and Grande 2007). However, when questions are linked with immigration or 
the European economic crisis (and especially issues of the common currency or 
identification with the EU), the national scale is immediately re-invoked and defended, 
particularly with reference to the superior democratic capacity of the Danish state, as 
well as its fragility as a small nation likely to be swamped by European or global problems. 
Our findings thus suggest some interesting particularities of the everyday effects of 
Europeanisation and globalisation in Denmark, and how various types of mobilities 
expressed and embodied by Danes in their everyday practices are quite separate from 
their political opinions and values. 
To summarise our findings, our data portrays a group of Danes as a peculiar mix of 
politically and culturally engaged citizens at local, national, European and global scales 
alike. Yet the fluidity of different scales in everyday life is highly contrasted both among 
the group of interviewees, but also in different contexts. Denmark is a nation with what 
seems to be a general well-travelled population and consequently the effect of class as 
well as the centre/periphery hypothesis do not seem to hold as much as they might do in 
other countries; at least not when it comes to the intensity of transnational practices or 
cosmopolitan attitudes. Dependent on the context, choice of life style and self-perception 
seem to be the most decisive factor in determining the most significant difference among 
this group of interviewees when negotiating transnational practices in everyday life. 
While the periphery is no less transnational than people living in Copenhagen, this data 
indicates differences in the form of integration of these practices and as well as the 
reason for crossing borders or buying products online. For example, one respondent living 
in the North East of Jutland and classified “low transnational” in fact was highly aware 
about the benefits of global flows and how she benefitted from the EU. Her use of the 
Internet, for instance, is a good indication of how the EU has certainly made it easier to 
live in a small town and she told a lot about the use of (particularly) Amazon in Germany 
which consequently created a very pragmatic and economic relationship to crossing 
borders as the next quote indicates.  
We feel that [closeness] even more with Hamburg though. We go there a lot. And that’s simply what 
we pick, and we pick that over Copenhagen actually […]. We do actually [like it better than going to 
Copenhagen]. From here and then on the high way, it takes no time […]. In the beginning when we 
talked about it, it was like: “But that’s another country, that’s Germany”. But there isn’t anyone at 
the border anymore, you don’t even notice passing it. 
This was mainly part of their belonging strategies behind choosing residential placement 
as well as their motivation for travelling. Place and perceptions of place in a variety of 
ways seem to depict a certain cultural status and profile – as we saw in the perceptions of 
a travel-hierarchy that existed among some of the interviewees, where Europe is simply 
the most “ordinary” travel destination in some cases, so ordinary that going there seems 
less a “serious” trip than if you cross the Atlantic to the West or the Ural Mountains to 
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the East. Hence, this is witness to the fact that the banal integration of transnational 
practices might very well be established in the European space.   
The data also show that the national scale is in fact intertwined with many other 
experiences of being European and using Europe as well as the world; that is, in the 
context of travels and other practices as part of social distinction, individuality, residence 
and general “free living”. At the same time, identification with Europe and the EU is also 
affected by the experience of being clearly part of a national community which currently 
seems to be invoked mostly due to the economic crisis or when talking about 
immigration. Such stories indicated that the wish to uphold the national was mostly in a 
political context; on these issues, there is a decrease in (EU)ropean attachments, an 
attachment which had been so vividly expressed as an almost second home earlier when 
travelling had been the focus. Thus what interviews also clarify is the importance of 
untangling experiential frames of, at once the local and the city, the national, the 
European and the global scales, which show not only what the European or the national 
might be, but more significantly when the different scales are invoked and thus when 
they become meaningful (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). In this case we can therefore assign 
the European space much more credit than might be the case if we only measured the 
political convictions about the EU that would be expressed in a quantitative survey. The 
transnational and cosmopolitan Danes are more visible when they are not talking about 
politics. 
Denmark is a good place to start as a case in Europe, because it is ideal typical of a highly 
globalised, highly affluent, yet highly cohesive and relatively homogenous society. It is 
routinely rated as one of the most highly globalised societies on Earth (Dreher et al. 
2008). Yet it combines high levels of social transnationalism with high levels of national 
loyalty: mobilities are not an “exit” issue in terms of brain drain or the flight of capital, 
and Danes are very rarely driven to move themselves or their activities outside of the 
country for reasons of pure economic disadvantage. It is, in other words, the epitome of 
the privileged and economically successful North-West of Europe, which has combined 
growth and affluence with a high level of welfare and social protection, and in which 
mobilities are more a matter of choice, consumption and lifestyle, yet highly diffused 
across society. We see European transnationalism under ideal conditions; yet we also see 
through our analysis that high levels of practical Europeanised behaviour is not 
necessarily accompanied by high levels of support for the European project.  
The Spanish 
How do things look in contrast, in the South of Europe? In contrast to Denmark, the 
Spanish history of travelling abroad is not dating as far back as to the 50s; at least not for 
the majority of the population. As one respondent says: 
I don’t know how young people have it these days because maybe things are not better or worse, 
they are just different, but I don’t think that there is so much difference from my time. Bear in mind 
that when I went abroad I was 17, it was in 1963, and Spanish were not used to travelling abroad 
during summer. But there were some who did it, anyway, it was not very common.  
As in the other Mediterranean countries the sun shines in their own country and summer 
holidays are therefore also likely to be at their own coast and without crossing any 
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borders. This would partly explain the low Spanish numbers on mobility and trips in the 
past 24 months (Table 2). This is obviously a different story than among the Northern 
Europeans who line up every year on the German highways to go South. Some of the 
older interviewees in Spain tell stories about how few travelled around Europe in the 
1960s and 1970s, but also how they as tourists were blacklisted due to the international 
view on Franco-ruled Spain. However, having experienced the change from when Franco 
was still alive, this seems to have had an effect on how the Spanish people today enjoy 
their freedom to speak and travel, which can be seen in terms of certain “international 
choices” and general reflections that still seem to be enhanced in the light of the Spanish 
past. 
Advancing in language proficiencies is especially something that the older population is 
very focused on in relation to the new global opportunities. From such discussions it also 
become clear that what we could refer to as Spanish cosmopolitanism is based on more 
virtual mobilities than the Danish hard-core physical mobility. Also Spanish respondents 
seem more pragmatic in their openness as learning languages in both in terms of 
travelling to new places, but also increasing opportunities to be involved in new and other 
work-relations with foreign countries. 
There is a clear difference between the Danes and the Spanish on the front of physical 
mobility, especially when it comes to “leisure movement” or moving “without a reason” 
and there is a tendency among the Spanish to go to countries close to their own. Though 
there surely are interviewees from Spain who are extremely well travelled as well, what 
travelling means to them appears a lot more modest, and to what extent this is relevant 
to their self-perception, is also less evident than in the Danish cases.  
Lack of language proficiency might be one explanation as this was not even a topic in the 
Danish interviews: there was much frustration among Southern European populations at 
how they were bad at making themselves understood in other languages. Hence, in this 
respect, the Spanish seem to perceive themselves as somewhat more restricted in the 
places they are able to travel to because of language. The Danes also appear less 
restricted in their talks about being mobile. It is not questioned anymore, whereas a 
profound part of the Spanish population still remembers the past and did not “grow up” 
with travelling. The economic crisis since 2008 has also changed the character of mobility 
as people are indeed leaving Spain to find work, which is mentioned in the interviews and 
inevitably gives mobility with a more pragmatic character. Whereas freedom to move is 
mainly only seen as good in Denmark as a personal asset (not in term of immigration), the 
Spanish are forced to think of the necessity to move because their country is currently in 
a deep crisis. Mobility is thus in general much more politicised than it is in Denmark. 
Mobility and politics goes together in Denmark only when you talk about immigration; 
otherwise it is associated with dreams, opportunities and self-development. In Spain, the 
historical pathway of the country have left mobility and therefore also their cosmopolitan 
outlook with a very different character. In Spain, mobility is today as it has been in the 
past, as much about politics as it is about leisure, except for the narrower group of those 
who can easily afford it and prioritise it. 
The Spanish clearly position themselves geographically in a different way. Latin America, 
unsurprisingly, is close. The same goes for places like Morocco, France, Italy and Portugal 
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(even to some extent Switzerland), countries which are often talked about as self-evident 
travel destinations. This is different from Denmark, Germany and Britain – colonialism 
certainly plays a role in these differences. Something indicates in the Spanish interviews 
that they are quite used to people coming from Morocco as immigrants and the distance 
is small. 
Sure. It is obvious that I have more things in common with a Spanish person or a European (than a 
Japanese person) because we are nearer, we have more contact, we share the currency... But 
anyway, I have less in common with a Pole than with a Moroccan because we’re neighbours, even 
though they are not European. But yes, you will always feel this union with a European, you have this 
connection. 
The European crisis and a growing hostility to “the South” (referred to quite commonly as 
the PIGS in Europe) is hinted at. Europe has lost some of it “goodness” and sense of 
solidarity. One interviewee was now very hesitant of drawing any points of identification 
with Northern European populations and he was extremely reluctant to think of the EU as 
anything else than German domination, though the EU was still good in terms of 
facilitating mobility. 
If Spain wasn’t in the EU it could have done things like depreciating the currency and other similar 
things. And maybe these would have improved our situation. But we cannot do anything because we 
are inside and, ok, it is true, when things go well it is great but when things go wrong... We cannot 
take the risk of letting this happen, what is going on now, it is not worth it. The crisis started when I 
was about 17 and so I wasn’t thinking about economic problems too much. I did not care. I was not 
thinking about Europe as something economic. I perceived it rather as something more cultural. I 
enjoyed it, such as the possibility to travel to all these countries. And all these scholarship agreements 
to study wherever you like. I liked all these things very much and I still like them. But this thing about 
economic union, I don’t see it very clearly. 
The Spanish in many cases are openly critical of their home environment and self-
perception, but many have only travelled in a more virtual sense, when compared with 
Danes. In contrast, it is almost the opposite case with Danes, where everybody travels, 
but where many are also more protective of their residence and home sphere. If place 
matters in Spain according to this small number of interviews, it seems like there are 
different varieties of this matter where the choice of place (or belonging to a place) is 
either pragmatic, forced or based on a feeling about the environment, such as climate. At 
least for some the crisis have given both the free choice of who they should identify with, 
as well as posing the question of international mobility. The willingness to move to a 
different country is therefore also rather large, which confirms the numbers in the 
EUCROSS dataset. This therefore forces some Spanish to be more pragmatic in their 
mobility, such as expanding their own global and cosmopolitan opportunities by learning 
a new language, taking Erasmus scholarships, or leaving to Germany for work (to which 
more than one was referring). 
The relation of place, belonging and the Europe/EU is bound up in many interviews. In the 
Danish interviews, place and city residence in many cases had a lot to do with self-
perception and lifestyle and even their approach to globalization, with contrasts between 
the peripheries and urban centre. In contrast, place, belonging and self-perception seem 
explicitly politicized in Spain: everyone is suffering the crisis, and the struggle often 
translates into regional concerns. Thoughts of mobility are immediately related to the 
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country’s political situation. This might also have something to do with the eyes looking at 
them from the outside. Spanish respondents seem highly aware of the world and Europe 
in the sense that they are aware of what others think about them and their politicians 
and in this sense there are a lot of “cross-border references”, whereas Danes are a lot 
more caught in their own bubble and a bit more careless and confident in their 
nationality. This is for instance evident when the Spanish talk about reading foreign 
media to get more or new perspectives on the matter, a further interesting banal effect 
of globalization as well as the crisis. 
In sum, the EU at an economic and political level seems to leave a huge divide among the 
Spanish. They are ambivalent in their idea of how Europe is today divided between North 
and South, with Germany placed in the middle as a sometimes too strong or diminant 
political neighbour, but sometimes as their way out of the crisis, perhaps through using 
mobility and exit options themselves.  
The Germans 
Regarding Germany, we focused on adding nuances to the extensive picture that Mau 
and his colleagues have provided on horizontal Europeanisation and transnational 
practices. The issue of being pro- or anti-EU is much less salient in Germany. However the 
former East/West divide has a significant effect on citizens’ perception on European 
freedom and Germany identity. Germans like the Spanish evoke the political crisis when 
thinking about the EU: it is as much a political space as it is an experiential and cultural 
space. Unlike with the Danes, politics is part of living in everyday Europe and is much 
more up front. 
This qualitative dataset does not reproduce the negative prejudices between the two 
parts of Germany; if anything some of the interviewees find it absurd that some Eastern 
and Western citizens are still living with this mental divide even though they were not 
even born then. However, there are also several references to the divide when we talk 
about freedom to move and a general globalization that demands cosmopolitan outlooks. 
A mother with children abroad and living in Western Germany reflected on how Germans 
should celebrate more the “wonderful” fact of free movement now, and also get over 
their prejudices to the Turkish population. She is proud her children are “cosmopolitan”:  
 We are getting more open. Let us be happy that the wall is gone. 
The possibility of being cosmopolitan citizens is something to be thankful for; and not 
least because of Germany’s own national history – that is the message here. It is not 
something that can be taken for granted and in this sense, the freedom to move is rather 
more linked in its connotations to national history, over and above European free 
movement policies. Moreover, the quote shows a similar “good quality” of the 
cosmopolitan outlook as we also find in the Danish interviews, where being global and 
cosmopolitan is a personal lifestyle and asset; something you characterize yourself and 
others with, that is, as a form of distinction. This is in contrast to Spain where it appeared 
as a more pragmatic approach to make use of the world’s resources of work and a way to 
upgrade your ability to be part of the world economy. 
Another interesting aspect is how being “European” can also be a positive reference point 
in the sense that “Germanness” does not seem to have clarified meaning – and again, the 
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old divide shows its face, as in this quote from a former East German, when asked if he 
felt European:  
Well, definitely, more as European than, what do I know, German, I dare to say. Well this is probably 
because I have lived in different countries and perhaps have not gained ground  back here again. As 
far as the mentality is concerned and so on. And hmm, for this reason rather European than German. 
For Germans, there seem to be a fine line between cultural Europe and political Europe, 
which might be caused by the role that Germany has been given as a consequence of the 
crisis. This is now also to be found in the attitudes among the German citizens. Moreover, 
Germans also seem to have a geopolitical location that provides different and many types 
of transnational networks to the Germans both in a political and personal sense. There is 
a much more and different references to countries, for example to the Balkans and other 
East European countries, than in Denmark or Spain.  
Germanness is difficult to grasp from the dataset. The feeling may not be so strong, or it 
may be hidden in the minds of Germans because of their history with nationalism. There 
is also little reference to other parts of Germany. People seem to be rather local or 
regional, and intra-national movement is not something that shows up in their talks about 
neighborhood or residence. In Germany, Berlin is not the obvious big, global city to which 
all the small time village people flee to evade narrow-minded citizens; at least not as 
obviously as it is for the Danes with Copenhagen. Instead, every region in Germany seems 
to have its own big city that would contrast with local village life. Country size and the 
network of mid-sized cities in Germany surely matters in this respect. On the other hand, 
the cosmopolitanism of certain Germans seems itself to be dependent on quite typical 
German traits: for example, a distrust for newpapers and the media, which pushes them 
to check and compare how the media might be covering it in another country such as the 
UK.  
The British 
The UK, like Denmark, has a specific national state of mind when it comes to Europe, as 
well as it comes to travelling. On this front, the Danes, the Germans and the British 
exemplify their privileged position, incorporating mobility as a more routine or banal 
factor or everyday life, and the advantage of globalisation, in a different way to the 
Spanish in the South. Travelling represents a certain lifestyle, and is also about being 
categorised as such in terms of social distinction. It is not only about working or 
holidaying, but is also a life lesson in seeing the world or seeking authenticity.  
The interviewees were primarily happy about living in Europe, but though they were very 
open to other parts of the world, thinking about such experiences would also sometimes 
be the route to expressing oneself about the rest of the world in a less flattering and 
exclusive way, about what Europe seemed to be or not, or where certain European 
trademarks would be portrait as “the good way” to do things. 
I think that when something daft like the Eurovision song comes to have Israelis in it, that’s 
ridiculous: they’re Middle Eastern. I am [also] not so sure I class Turkey as Europe. I know that Turkey 
wants to be part of the European Union but I don’t class it as Europe.  
At the same time (and not without self-contradiction), there is of course a distance to 
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Europe expressed among the British interviewees. Negative comments about European 
immigrants are now commonplace.  
Because we are an island, aren’t we? There is going to be a saturation point at some point. 
A very typical reflection on European identity goes as follows: 
Britain or the United Kingdom is not particularly European really. Everyone in Britain pretty much 
hates Europe and blames Europe for any problems. I suppose with Western Europe it is quite similar 
culture, but with Europe it is a vastly different culture... I don’t think most people in the North of 
England will consider themselves European.  
The question opens up the way to embracing English nationalism: 
The fact that I really do not associate with Britain, lessens the tie with Europe, so I do not consider 
myself European. But again if I was in American, then again I would be European. 
Internal distinctions in the UK do matter: such as its own North/South divide. Non-
Londoners, identify London – which is also seen as the main city of UK’s fabled 
multiculturalism and diversity, as is Copenhagen – with being unfriendly, depressing, 
lonely. A true Briton can even feel a “foreigner” in London, hearing nothing but foreign 
languages on the tube. Others meanwhile, strongly identify with London.  
The British, similar to Danes, are in general satisfied with life in Britain and most people 
prefer to stay in Britain. There is a sense that people are more flexible with their country 
of residence in Germany or Spain. To some extent, as also in Denmark, residence is 
evaluated from a social and family perspective and it therefore becomes a hindrance for 
moving away. Language (as for the Spanish) is also a major hindrance. We therefore see a 
similar type of satisfaction with the UK among the British as we find among Danes with 
Denmark. Many of the interviewees also express this through taking a stand on their 
neighbourhood and their city, and contrasting it with other cities, then identifying with 
their country as especially a place where they like to live. Pure Danishness is stronger 
than being British because the larger category is now highly conflicted with Englishness. 
There is growing differentiating within the UK, which is mixed up with people’s thoughts 
about the EU, the European region and the UK’s place in the global: a self-contradictory 
mix. 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have offered an analysis of the relation of transnational practices to 
cosmopolitan values in the EUCROSS survey, investigating how they vary by social 
position and by national context across Europe. Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism 
can be found to be very similar in scale and intensity in Denmark, Germany and Britain, 
which belies the Danish and British Euroscepticism often expressed in these countries in 
so far as many of these practices are concretely linked to European integration. While 
finding obvious and unsurprising evidence that transnationalism and cosmopolitanism is 
associated with higher class positions, we also show some tentative evidence for a 
broader diffusion of opportunities for mobility across middle classes in Europe than 
suggested by Fligstein and others (particularly in Denmark and Germany), as well as 
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evidence that the people whose values change the most in a cosmopolitan direction 
when exposed to transnational experiences are those from a lower social class 
background. 
In the second part, we offer a first analysis of some the most salient variable meanings 
and framings found in the qualitative survey EUMEAN. Taking Denmark as the ideal 
typical successful European society, we see how transnationalism and Europeanisation 
have become banal, while neither negating strong national affiliation, and defensiveness 
towards Danish homogeneity. In other respects, the Danes are exemplary cosmopolitans, 
with Europe a zone of lifestyle choices and easy mobility, but there is a mismatch with 
their European opinions. Germany and the UK offer views on mobilities and identity that 
might be closely expected: heavily determined by geographical position and national 
history. They share similar degrees of cosmopolitanism, but give it very different 
meanings in relation to national particularities. Meanwhile, it is only the Spanish in our 
analysis of these four worlds of European transnationalism who are conscious of the 
primary economic justifications for European mobility rights. Yet they are markedly less 
experienced and more rooted in their everyday lives. 
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